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ABSTRACT' 
The agreement on Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in the European Union 
(EU) is a significant move in the integration process. When explaining why EMU 
was accepted and incorporated in the Maastricht Treaty, little attention has been 
given to the role of monetary experts in this process. lbis paper examines their role 
in the creation of EMU by focusing on the Delors Committee that wrote the blueprint 
for EMU which was inserted in the Maastricht Treaty with few amendments. The 
paper discusses whether it was necessary for the EMU momentum that these 
monetary experts held similar ideas about how European monetary integration had to 
proceed. Furthermore, it investigates whether the Delors Committee fits the 
definition of an 'epistemic community' (Haas 1992) and concludes that this is indeed 
the case. The paper closes by suggesting that this conceptual tool could enlarge our 
understanding of the role of expert committees in the process of European public 
policy-making. 
Keywords: Central banks; Economic and Monetary Union (EMU); European 
integration theory; Epistemic communities; Delors Report; Maastricht Treaty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since the Heads of States and Governments decided to create an Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) at the European Council meeting in Maastricht in 1991. 
followed by the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, a large number of 
studies have examined why Member States decided to create an EMU in the 
European Union (EU). In their attempt to understand the EMU process, 
contemporary authors have examined a number of explanatory variables such as, 
the role of domestic politics, certain economic ideas, the intergovernmental 
bargaining process, global factors , interdependence, the importance of EC 
institutions and the institutional framework of Member States. Individual 
scholars place a different emphasis on the importance of all , or a number of these 
factors in contributing to the momentum which culminated in the Maastricht 
Treaty. Yet, it is argued here that in addition to these factors one also needs to 
examine the process of creating the blueprint for EMU. Though there have been 
many studies explaining the EMU process, only limited attention has been paid 
to the role of knowledge, expertise, ideas and the role of expert committees in 
explaining the EMU process (exceptions are Cameron 1995; Dyson 1994; Dyson, 
Featherstone and Michalopoulos 1995; McNamara 1998). The Delors Report 
which set out the blueprint for EMU which was incorporated with only minor 
changes in the Maastricht Treaty (Artis 1992; Gros and Thygesen 1998), has not 
been examined carefully. The role of the so-called 'Delors Committee' has not 
been the subject of scrutiny. This paper addresses these issues . 
It is not new to the European integration process that Member States 
choose to ask a group of experts to suggest a possible blueprint for increased 
integration or policy cooperation. In fact, many studies have displayed the 
Community's integration modus operadus as being incremental, based on 
technical expertise and knowledge and to be of an a-poht1cal nature. Recently 
several legal scholars have studied the role of expert committees in the EC 
decision-making process, also known as 'comitology', ·and emphasised the extent 
of the use of committees in the process (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Vos 1997). In 
part the widespread use of expert committees in the EU policy-making results/ 
from the fact that the European policy-making arena is quite distinct from thef 
national one. The equivalent of a national government and parliamenti virtually&-
absent. As a result some ~ra~itiona! political channe~s, such as. political partie5_)do 
not play as much of a s1gmficant role as they do m the natwna -arena. A-truly 
public debate on European policy-making is absent as most of the ~ is 
nationally oriented, resulting in debates about the EU being held in the national 
domain. Finally, as has happen~d to European governments more generally, 
European governance has gone through a process of restructuring , which has 
given rise to a regulatory state instead of a interventionist, redistributive state 
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(Majone 1997). This restructuring process has also contributed to the more 
frequent consultation of expert committees. 
Given this specific EC/EU policy environment, the Commission plays a 
large role in day-to-day policy making (Nugent 1995). As that institution has 
only limited staff, it cannot deliver all the specialised expertise in the policy-
making process. Hence, it benefits from listening to and cooperating with expert 
committees. Likewise, the European Council and the Council of Ministers also 
are confronted by these institutional reStrictions (Hayes-Re nshaw and- Wallace 
1995) and hence also need the help from expert committees. This paper seeks to 
explore the role of monetary experts, in particular a specific group of monetary 
experts, the Delors Committee, in the EMU process. The aim of the paper is to 
apply the epistemic community concept and to examine how it contributes to our 
understandmg o e EMU process. The central question posed here is: Is the fact 
(that EMU was successfully incorporated in the Treaty rooted in consensus among 
L important monetary experts -- the Delors Committee -- about national monetary 
policies and thus European monetary policy? In addressing this main question 
three subquestions are examined: What factors does the literature on EMU 
attribute to explaining EMU? What was the role of monetary experts? Does the 
conceptual tool of 'epistemic communities' (Haas 1992 ), which examines the role 
of knowledge among experts, contribute to our understanding of the EMU 
process? 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the current explanations of why EMU happened, followed by a discussion of the 
epistemic communities approach in the three subsequent sections. The 
penultimate section examines whether the Delors Committee could be considered 
an epistemic community. Some conclusions about the role of experts in creating 
EMU, and the examination of the utility of the conceptual tool of the 'epistemic 
community' are provided in the last section. 
EXPLAINING EMU 
Puzzled by the acceptance of creating an EMU in the EC, many authors have 
investigated what caused this progress in European monetary policy-making. 
Clearly the historical background and changes in the global political economy 
generated some momentum for further monetary integration. Already in the 
1970s a first EMU initiative had been launched which failed due to unfavourable 
international circumstances and divergence in economic and monetary policy-
making in the Member States. However, towards the end of the 1970s and early 
1980s it became widely accepted that there was no trade-off between inflation 
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and unemployment. When the European Monetary System (EMS) became 
operational in March 1979 Member State policy-makers stood on the eve of a 
change in the general monetary policy-making regime. During the 1980s 
monetary policies became geared towards reducing inflation, though not all 
central banks were equally successful in obtaining this objective. A low inflation 
objective became the basis of further monetary cooperation in the 1980s, 
especially after the French government realised it could not pursue 'socialist 
policies' in one country. Interestingly, it was the Finance Minister Jacques 
Delors, who later became the EC President and as such chaired the Delors 
Committee, who had taken this overnight decision. 
Policy convergence in the institutional framework of the EMS also seemed 
to become apparent in the late 1980s. The EMS had developed quite successfully 
during the mid 1980s after having gone through a difficult initial period. The D-
Mark became the de facto anchor currency, and Member State governments 
started to pursue policies towards low inflation. Their method was to shadow 
German monetary policies (see Goodman 1992). Consequently, when in the late 
1980s this policy proved effectiv the governments of countries participating in 
the JTh:1S started to view it as a 'political symbol' o.!:_ successful Euro ean 
nte ration. 
However, these changes alone would not have been enough to create the 
EMU momentum which was to emerge in the late 1980s. The launching of the 
• Internal Market Programme contributed importantly to the renewed desire for an 
EMU in Europe (Vaciago 1991 ). As a result of the four freedoms, free movement 
of goods, services, persons and capital, the creation of an EMU in the EC was 
deemed necessary. Moreover, national e_olicy-makers also increasingly realised 
• that European economic interdependence, globalisation, and the growth of 
international capital markets reduced the room for manoeuvre in national policy-
making. Lar~e companie.s.. organised themselves in the Association for the 
Monetary Union in Europe (AMUs). which aimed at promoting the creation of 
EMU. Commission President ~. the French President, Fran9ois Mitterrand, 
and the German Chancellor Helmut IS2h.l as well as many other political leaders 
were very much in favour of EMU (Ross 1995: 79-88; Dinan 1994: 158-63). 
Jacques Delors thought a 'spill-over' momentum was needed to move the 
integration process forward. Already in the Single European Act a .. clause was 
(incorporated stating that the Single European Market (SgM) would necessitate 
h,.he creation of EMU. The link between the SEM and EMU was also at the core 
of an influential paper written by the German· Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich 
Gensche , published in February 1988, on the need for a European single 
currency and an independent European Central Bank (Genscher 1988). The 1988 
Hanover European Council entrusted a committee chaired by President Jacques 
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Delors the 'task of studying and proposing concrete stages lead ing towards this 
[economic and monetary] union' (Delors Report 1989: 3). 
Notwithstanding these important factors which gave rise to a renewed 
integration momentum, the creation of EMU still represented a major 
development in European integration and a substantial de artu.,!! from forn1al 
national sovereignty over monetary policy and would likely affect adjacent 
policy areas. In the literature on EMU various authors identify one or more of the 
following ' factors as having been very important in explaining the EMU 
agreement: the dominance of politics over economics (illler alia, Minkkinen and 
Patomaki 1997; Eichengreen and Frieden 1994), domestic politics (Mi lner 1993; 
Jones, Frieden and Torres 1998) domestic politics and certain ideas (Marcussen 
1997; McNan1ara 1998; Ungerer 1997), issue linkage (Martin 1993), the role of 
identity (Engelmann et al. 1997), international bargaining (Moravcsik 1998), 
institutional aspects (Campanella 1995; Kaufmann 1995), German reunification 
(Garrett 1993), the success of the EMS (Cameron 1997), the optimism 
surrounding the Internal Market Progrme (Sandholtz 1993; Sandholtz and 
Zysman 1989), financial market integration (Pauly 1992), globalisation or a 
combination of these factors (inter alia Dyson 1994; Sandholtz 1993; 1996; 
Verdun 1995). Few stress the fact that the Delors Report, drafted mainly by 
central bankers, strongly resembled the eventual EMU articles in the Maastricht 
Treaty. 
Pioneering work on the first EMU project (Werner Report 1970) which 
focused on the role of monetary experts was done by Rosenthal ( 1975). Her 
conclusion was that the EMU proposals materialized so quickly in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s because the monetary officials responsible for negotiating the 
Werner Report knew each other very well and had been working together over a 
period of many years. The same phenomenon has happened in the late 1980s 
when it was decided to let the Delors Committee fulfil a key role in the policy-
making process. 
Dyson et al. ( 1995) focus on the central bankers in the process leading up 
to EMU, and analyse why the central bankers were so successful in having the 
principle of central bank independence taken up in the Treaty. They find that 
none of the prevailing 'theories' explain central bank behaviour (Dyson et al. 
1995 : 475-9). They point to the need to take into account the "powerful structural 
forces" which have shaped central bank performance. Their conclusion is that the 
crucial factor in explaining central bankers' influence in the EMU process should 
\
be found in the "structural changes in the nature and structure of capitalism, 
notably the relationship between EC states and global financial markets and the 
phenomenon of inflation." (Dyson et al. 1995: 484). Hence these authors identify 
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the institutional arrangements in the EC, the changes in the global economy. 
including changed perceptions about economic and monetary policy objectives. 
as the primary factors which determined the EMU process. 
Kenneth Dyson (1994) has written the most recent comprehensive study 
on EMU. His central argument is "that the EMS and EMU policy process is best 
understood as composed of a distinct set of interdependent bargaining relations 
and rules of the game, embedded in a framework of structures that they have~a 
limited, and fluctuating, capacity to influence." (Dyson 1994: x). His book takes 
a 'two-level game' perspective and looks at the policy actors. , the bargaining 
relations and what he calls 'structural power in the international political 
economy'. His central thesis is that the EMU process is shaped by the 'will and 
capacity of the central actors involved '. Four factors influence this will and 
capacity. First, the actors have to operate in a 'scene', a 'two level garne'. 1 
Moreover, these central actors have also held certain economic beliefs. Thirdly, 
these actors are confronted with changing structural conditions in the 
international political economy, and lastly, their will and capacity to create EMU 
is heavily influenced by their experience with European economic and monetary 
integration process, notably the EMS and EMU (Dyson 1994: I 0-17). · 
With respect to 'structural power', Dyson refers to control over a wide 
range of factors in the external environment (cf Strange 1988). These include. 
inter alia the control over the anchor currency, control over supply and demand 
of capital, control over 'economic fundamental s' and, notably, the "control over 
the key ideas and beliefs informing the policy process, in particular the 'capture' 
of the EMS policy process by economic ideas of 'sound money' and the 
prevalence of political beliefs about European union. " (Dyson 1994: 16). In 
addition to the national governments, the commission and the central banks, two 
technical committees -- the Monetary Committee and the Committee of Central 
Bank governors -- are of great importance, but these committees are not 
examined against the framework of an epistemic community. 
Finally, David Cameron (1995) has examined the role of monetary experts 
in the process leading to EMU. In his analysis he questions whether the process 
should be seen as primarily supranational or intergovernmental. His conclusion is 
that both types of politics were important, but transnational actors played an 
important role: 
"[T]ransnational actors and their politics were present and influential rhroughow the 
development of the EMU initiative, from the first meeting of the Delors Committee in 
1988 to the last meetings of the IGC nearly four years later, and in some respects and at 
some moments, they were more influential than either governmental or supranational 
actors." (Cameron 1995: 73-4. italics in the original). 
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The transnational actors he refers to are in fact monetary officials who were 
members of the Monetary Committee or the Committee of Central Bank 
Governors. Cameron points to the fact that these actors not only represented their 
national governments, but also a transnational community as they developed their 
own ideas during their frequent exchanges. They met one another regularly as 
their meetings were highly institutionalised. Cameron's line of thinking reminds 
us of the work done by Rosenthal on the Werner Report (1975), in which she 
draws similar conclusions. 
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES 
Let us now tum to an examination of the EMU process by using the conceptual 
tool of the 'epistemic community'. In 1992 a special issue of lntemational 
Organization was dedicated to epistemic communities.2 Peter Haas defines the 
concept as follows: 
"An epistemic community is a network of professionals from a variety of disciplines and 
backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which 
provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared 
causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing 
to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for 
elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; 
(3) shared notions of validity -- that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for 
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common 
policy enterprise -- that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems 
to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction 
that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence." (Haas 1992: 3). 
In addition to this formal definition additional characteristics are identified: 
"[M]embers of an epistemic community share intersubjective understandings; have a 
shared way of knowing; have shared patterns of reasoning; have a policy project 
drawing on shared causal beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices; and have a 
shared commitment to the application and production of knowledge." (Haas 1992: fn. 
5). 
An epistemic community can be called upon when national executives aim at 
achieving international policy coordination. Various Factors explain their 
emergence l"n the policy-making process which Haas labels "uncertainty", 
"interpretation" and "institutionalization" (Haas 1992: 3 ). Whether international 
policy coordination succeeds depends heavily on the policies of other countries. 
Moreover the policy choices concern consequences which can only partially be 
anticipated. This gives rise to the desire for information which is not so much 
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based on purely technical knowledge but rather information which is the product 
of human interpretation. ·(Haas 1992: 4). Epistemic communities, either national 
or transnational, are one possible provider of such information. Because 
decision-makers seek their advice, which is an interpretation of facts, these 
epistemic communities contribute to the way national policy-makers formulate 
their interests. The transnational epistemic community, in a sense, is even more 
influential as its "causal beliefs" and "policy preferences" can be displayed to all 
national policy-makers who seek their advice. 
The "uncertainty" which the decision-makers face is a result of the 
increasing complex and technical nature of the issues on the international agenda. 
These issues include among other things monetary and macroeconomic issues 
(Haas 1992: 12). The "uncertainty" factor is very important as it increases the 
incentives for the decision-makers to consult epistemic communities especially 
when a shock or crisis occurs (see Haas 1992: 14-6). 
Who constitute an epistemic community? Excluded are a broader scientific 
community, or people working in the same profession and/or di scipline, unless 
they work in accordance with their principled values. The members of the 
epistemic community can be distinguished from these people as they try to obtain 
a goal they believe in (Haas 1992: 19). Notwithstanding these observations, 
members of a particular subgroup of a discipline, could well form an epistemic 
community.3 In other words , for a knowledge-based group to be included in 
Haas' definition , it is important that the members share rinci led normative and 
causal beliefs. As for the influence of epistemic communities, Adler and Haas 
cone u e t at the more influential epistemic communities are in their respective 
nation-states, the greater the likelihood that national governments of these 
nation-states will endorse the epistemic communities' values and practices (Adler 
and Haas 1992: 371-2). 
How do epistemic communities exert influence? Adler and Haas identify 
four mechanisms. First by policy innovation they frame the issue, i.e. decide the 
nature of the issue, the policy objectives, and at what level (in which forum) the 
issue should be solved. These initial choices set the stage for defining national 
interests. Second, policy diffusion , which refers to the mechanism with which 
members of epistemic communities communicate using transnational links to 
make their views known. The acceptance of their ideas by others across the 
globe, in tum, can be used to put pressure on national governments. Third, policy 
selection, can take place. In this case, decision makers seek support from a 
selected epistemic community which they know will support their policies. This I 
approach enables the decision-makers t<(~ their policy choices by 
eferrin to the community of experts who approve of thetr policy choices. 
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Fourthly, policy persistence, the continuation of consensus of ideas, beliefs and 
goals over time among the members of the epistemic communities contributes to 
their credibility, and hence their authority. and thus it also determines how long 
an epistemic community remains influential. Finally, policy evolution as 
learning. Epistemic communities can contribute decisively to the process of 
learning, which is very important as the final understanding of a policy issue 
determines the policy outcome. (Adler and Haas 1992: 375-87). 
EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES APPROACH FOR EC POLICY-MAKING 
As was mentioned above, the EC policy-making process is a healthy feeding 
ground for the role of expert committees. The epistemic communities approach 
has been used before, though not very frequently, to analyse the EC policy-
making process (inter alia Radaelli 1995; 1996; 1997; Richardson 1996; Dudley 
and Richardson 1996; Wright 1997; Zito 1995; 1998) and international 
cooperation more generally (inter alia Haas 1997; Risse-Kappen 1994). These 
studies point to the creation of a common policy enterprise on the basis of a 
group of individuals with shared causal beliefs. The advantages of using such an 
approach is that it gives insight into the process of policy-formulation in the 
period prior to the final decision-taking process. The epistemic communities 
approach also is more clearly defined than a rivalling or complementary 
theoretical tool of policy networks (Borzel 1997). Yet, the disadvantages of 
applying Haas' definition of epistemic communities is that it is so rigid that it is 
difficult to ever find a community of experts that is sufficiently fulfilling Haas' 
conditions (Wright 1997: 41). Radaelli has warned against an "anthropomorphic" 
view of knowledge produced by the experts that form an epistemic community 
(Radaelli 1997: 169). He argues that knowledge "has less to do with specific 
actors than with the structure in which actors act" (ibid). Some authors have 
suggested to use an 'advocacy coalitions approach' (Sabatier 1988; 1998; Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith 1991 ). This approach also focuses on the role of experts in the 
policy making process. Sabatier argues what binds an advocacy coalition is their 
core of shared beliefs which need to be stable over time (at least a decade). 
Hence they share a common belief system.4 The advocacy coalition approach is 
most appropriate to explain the outcome of the policy process when there are two 
or more rival advocacy coalitions.5 Thus, it is not appropriate for our study of the 
Delors Committee, as there were no clear rivalling advocacy coalitions. Let us 
tum to an earlier case study of central bankers convergence of policies of the 
industrial states during the debt crisis of the early 1980s which used an epistemic 
communities approach. 
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CENTRAL BANKERS AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY? 
Ethan Kapstein (1992) tries to understand why policies converged and finds the 
answer in the power capabilities and shared political purpose of Britain and the 
United States. Central bankers, who played a key role in enhancing multilateral 
cooperation in banking regulation, he concludes, did not fit the definition of an 
epistemic community as used in the special issue of /ntemational Organization : 
"The central bankers involved in this case were a group of bureaucrats who were 
attempting to serve several conflicting public and private sector imerests in an effort to 
maintain if 1101 enhance their positional power in their domestic political stntctllres. 
Unlike the policy projects of the environmentalists ( .. . ) the policy project of the central 
bankers ( ... ) was not solely the product of ri gorous scientific investigation. It also 
reflected a political decision. ( .. . ) The decision to pursue the idea of a single capital 
adequacy standard was not so much the product of collective technical knowledge as it 
was the reflection of what the British and American central bankers considered to be the 
'art of the possible' given the international and domestic politics in which the debt crisis 
was embedded. ( ... ) [T]here was little in the literature of regulatory theory to suggest that 
this was the 'best' method for strengthening the international payment system."(Kapstein 
1992: 266-7). 
Kapstein's conclusions that central bankers cannot be considered as an epistemic 
community with regard to the debt issue is partially convincing. In this case they 
were serving conflicting interests. lt can be questioned, however, whether 
Kapstein's other arguments could be interpreted differently. Indeed, Adler and 
Haas stress that decision-makers may seek advise from the epistemic community 
which is willing to support their policy choice's. In this scenario other epistemic 
communities would exist which would disagree with these policy choices. Thus, 
for a central banking community to be an epistemic community, there is no need 
for regulatory theory to suggest only one 'best' method. Moreover, the notion of 
the epistemic community requires the members to have a commitment to a 
political goal, and to interpret their knowledge in such a way that it supports their 
goal. In fact, as was indicated above, a purely scientific community is not an 
epistemic community if it does not interpret facts, and/or does not aim for a 
common cause. 
Kapstein's analysis shows convincingly, however, that the community of 
central bankers was divided over their final goal during most of the 1980s, and it 
was only in a later stage that an accord was reached. This implies that during this 
period one cannot interpret the central bankers to have constituted an epistemic 
community. Should they, however, have been considered an epistemic 
community, once they did agree on a political goal? Kapstein discards this 
possibility because his analysis of the final agreement suggests it was a product 
of "state power and collective purpose" (Kapstein 1992: 286). Britain and the 
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United States were the leading forces, and Kapstein strongly doubts whether an 
agreement would have been reached without their leadership. It is not clear 
whether 'leadership' within an epistemic community has been allowed for; Haas' 
definition of the epistemic community does not mention anything about whether 
hierarchies may or may not exist within an epistemic community. However, it is 
hardly imaginable that an epistemic community would exist consisting of 
completely equal persons, or that it would not allow for the concept of 
'leadership'. Ergo, Haas' definition should be clarified on this point. It would be 
useful to accept that within an epistemic community leadership could exist. 
Perhaps a certain hierarchy of its members could exist, which could give rise to 
some members having more and others less influence within the epistemic 
community. 
Does the fact that Kapstein's case study of the debt crisis in the 1980s 
exclude the possibility that central bankers in the EC with regard to monetary 
policies would still not constitute an epistemic community? Kapstein has already 
pre-empted the question by setting out in his article under which conditions he 
would consider the central banking community an epistemic community. He 
identifies the need for three conditions: first, substantially more consensus on 
theoretical and empirical knowledge on international banking would have to 
emerge. Second, regulatory policies would have to become based on this 
consensual knowledge rather than national political ideologies. Third, "a 
supranational regulatory agency would probably be needed to insulate bank 
supervisors from domestic political pressures." (Kapstein 1992: 268). 
To apply Kapstein's conditions to our case of monetary policy we only 
need to make minor changes in the wording of the conditions. Where Kapstein 
refers to "international banking" we shall insert "monetary policy". Let us now 
examine whether these conditions are met. First, as regards theoretical and 
empirical knowledge on monetary policy it appears that central bankers indeed 
held common views on the aims of monetary policy, namely to reach price 
stability. The second condition reads that "regulatory policies" would have to be 
based on this consensus. Again, this condition seems to have been fulfilled. The 
central bankers and monetary experts who drafted the Delors Report all agreed 
that monetary policies should be moved away from political influence. In EMU 
monetary authorities were not be influenced by any political actor. To guarantee 
this independence monetary policies would be transferred to an independent 
European System of Central Banks, which was to be kept free from political 
influence. This brings us to Kapstein's third condition, i.e. the need for a 
"supranational regulatory agency" which was indeed put in place to protect the 
central bankers from "domestic political pressures." The politically independent 
ESCB perfectly fits the requirement. 
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THE DELORS COMMITTEE-- AN EPISTEMIC COMMUNITY? 
The above discussion suggests that central bankers may constitute an episternic 
community if they meet regularly in an (inter)national forum or in an institution. 
Let us now tum to the Delors Committee, whose task it was to study and propose 
concrete stages leading to the creation of EMU, and recall its composition. 
The members of the Delors Committee were selected by the European 
Council during the Hanover Summit in June 1988. Before this decision was 
taken, suggestions had been made about the composition and mandate of the 
committee. The German Foreign Minister Genscher had suggested a committee 
of independent experts (Genscher 1988). The central banks wanted to be 
represented in this committee. However, Delors was against the idea of having 
the Monetary Committee or the Committee of Central Bank Governors draft a 
proposal. The final decision was taken at the EC Summit in Hanover.6 The 
European Council decided that the Committee chaired by President Delors would 
consist of the twelve central bank Presidents or Governors, "one other member of 
the Commission"-- Frans Andriessen, DG I -- and "three personalities designated 
by conunon agreement by the Heads of State or Government ( ... ): Alexandre 
Lamfalussy, then the General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)
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, Niels Thygesen, a professor of econornics8, and Miguel Boyer, president 
of Banco Exterior de Espana." (Conclusions of the European Council in 
Hanover, 27-28 June 1988). In early July 1988 Delors announced that he had 
selected Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa as the committee's rapporteur. Padoa-
Schioppa had been rapporteur of an earlier Commission report (Padoa-Schioppa 
1987), was a former Head of DG-11, and had worked for the Banca d'ltalia. 
Following pressure from Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Bundesbank president 
Pohl , who were concerned that 'German' interests would not be adequately 
represented, Delors appointed a second rapporteur, Gunter Baer -- a German 
official working at the BIS . 
President Delors himself was from the very outset much involved with the 
committee and its task. In the summer he sent round a list of questions for 
discussion in the first meeting in September. These included questions about 
whether a common parallel or a single currency was necessary; whether a 
European Fund or a European Central Bank would need to be created, and if the 
latter be preferred, what its statutes would be; what transi tion stages would look 
like; the connection between 'economic' and 'monetary' union; the necessary 
macroeconomic conditions to enable a successful EMU, and finally, what 
institutional changes would required to create EMU (Agence Europe, 12/13 
September 1988, 4850, 5). 
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By setting the agenda in this way, Jacques Delors ignored the objections 
voiced earlier by the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher. She explicitly 
opposed any institutional change. But the members of the conunittee did not 
share Thatcher's concern, not even the Bank of England Governor, Robin Leigh-
Pemberton, as they were setting out a 'possible blueprint' for EMU. During the 
course of the committee meetings it became clear that the conunittee members 
were interested in creating a feasible blueprint, but that they would leave the 
political decision to the Heads of State and Governments. 
The eight meetings took place on a monthly basis, at the time of the G-10 
meetings of central bankers in Basel, at the BIS. During the first meeting, in 
Basel in September 1988, the conunittee held discussions on the basis of the 
papers prepared by Delors and his officials . Delors asked the committee members 
to discuss constructively the papers that were on the table. The committee 
members were each asked to submit papers discussion the Werner Report. the 
EMS etc. These papers were all discussed and annexed to the final Delors Report 
and included in the final publication (Delors Report 1989). With the help of the 
Commission and the BIS secretariat, Delors arranged a draft report to be ready 
for the December meeting (Agence Europe, 15 December 1988,4915: 15). 
During the December meeting there was a heated debate about several 
aspects of the draft report, and the discussion went on well into the spring of 
1989. Realising that his objective had failed, i.e. to have a report agreed to during 
the March meeting, Delors decided to call an extra meeting in early April. The 
debate centred around two main controversies (Wolf 1997: 42). The first one 
concerned the question of whether a parallel currency could be introduced, and 
related questions. The second question focused on which measures would be 
necessary in which stage in order to obtain EMU. The French and Italian central 
bank governors had already been asking for a more widespread use of the ECU, 
and now saw EMU as potentially being able to promote its use, and also the 
creation of a European monetary fund (Larosiere 1989). In the long run it was 
hoped it would be possible to create more stability vis-a-vis the dollar, but it 
would also give another impulse to the internal market. But it was exactly this 
envisaged fund that attracted opposition from the German and Dutch central bank 
governors in the conunittee (Duisenberg 1989; Pohl 1989). During the spring it 
finally became clear that there was a majority against a parallel currency. The 
reason being that a parallel currency made would render it more difficult to 
ensure stability (Wolf 1997). 
Delors was in favour of an aim of a single currency and a European 
Central Bank flanked by coordination of macroeconomic policies of the member 
states. With the support of Pohl, Duisenberg and Leigh-Pemberton this became a 
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clear objective in the report. Yet, the committee decided that the final political 
decision about these matters should remain with the national governments (Gros 
and Thygesen 1998: 40 1-2; Verdun 1995). After these issues were settled, the 
desirable form of institutionalisation of the common monetary policy remained to 
be decided. The committee was surprisingly quick in deciding that it would 
require a federal central bank system, which would need to be independent. and 
would aim at price stability (see also Ungerer 1997: 200). Pohl had set out these 
criteria in his paper (Pohl 1989). There was almost no controversy among central 
bankers about the German 'model' to be the most useful model -- by contrast 
there still was controversy among national heads of state and governments 
(Agence Europe, 22 February 1989, 4960: 3; and 25 February 1989, 4963: 5). 
But the German and Dutch central bank governors stressed that by taking the 
German model as a point of departure, there would still remain some room for 
manoeuvre for national governments (Gros and Thygesen 1998: 404 ). 
During the March meeting the committee displayed a strong disagreement 
concerning the transition period to EMU. The core controversy was whether 
participation in the final stage of EMU would be obligatory with fixed dates or 
voluntary after certain conditions were met. This automatic move to the third 
stage was suggested so that the weaker countries would have some security about 
the EMU really taking place after they would have made serious re-adjustments. 
Simultaneously the debate centred around what the institutional arrangements 
should comprise of in the second stage (Financial Times 15 March 1989: 3; Gros 
and Thygesen 1998 403-6). But these were minor issues compared to the core 
consensus on the direction of monetary policy, and the institutional framework in 
which EMU would operate. Eventually the Committee decided not to insert fixed 
dates in the report, but rather to identify a three staged route to EMU. It also 
decided that there would be binding rules on the annual budgetary deficits 
(Delors Report, 1989; Financial Times 18 April 1989: 24 ). 
Given the importance that this committee had in drafting the EMU 
blueprint, could it be argued that here was an influential epistemic community at 
work? What kind of expertise did this community offer, and did it act as the 
theoretical framework suggests it would? The report was drafted in a relatively 
short time, and adopted unanimously. However, the Delors Committee had two 
members who dominated the sessions: President Delors and the Bundesbank 
President Karl-Otto Pohl (on the dominance of Pohl see also Dyson 1994: 129-
30) -- as had been the case with the central banking community in the Kapstein 
analysis, the Delors Committee was not without hierarchy. 
Not all expert committees will automatically form an epistemic 
community. In order for the Delors Committee to be an epistemic community it 
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needs to fulfil the four conditions provided in the definition. First, the committee 
shared a "set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide[ d) a value-based 
rationale for the social action of community members" . They all believed that 
further economic and monetary integration would be beneficiary to the EC. 
provided, of course, this development was based on certain principles. 
Second, they "shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis 
of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain 
and whi.::h then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between 
possible policy actions and desired outcome". This condition is also fulfilled by 
the committee. Their causal beliefs, based on their experience with the EMS and 
monetary policy in general, were fourfold . First, they believed that inflation was 
detrimental to growth. Second, stable exchange rates were necessary to ensure 
the proper operation of the Internal Market. Third, the de facto dominance of the 
D-Mark as the anchor currency, and hence the dominance of the Bundesbank in 
determining European monetary policies was politically unsatisfactory. Fourth, 
even though the Committee favoured a new European monetary institution, it 
was considered undesirable that an economic authority would be established at 
the supranational level. Rather, the Delors Committee wanted national 
governments to remain fully responsible for national macroeconomic and fiscal 
policies. Hence, the need for multiple linkages -- binding rules would be 
necessary to contain budget deficits (Delors Report 1989). 
The third condition "shared notion of validity" resembles the previous 
condition, and is also fulfilled. The Delors Committee members had similar 
criteria for weighing and validitating knowledge. The low inflation objective was 
considered the most important objective, and an independent central bank was 
needed to safeguard this objective and to ensure policy effectiveness. 
Finally, the fourth condition "a common policy enterprise" obviously 
exists as the Committee members were selected for this Committee exactly 
because they had the 'task of studying and proposing concrete stages leading 
towards this [economic and monetary] union' (Delors Report 1989: 3). Hence 
drafting the EMU blueprint was their common policy enterprise. 
Moving beyond the four conditions set out in the definition it appears that 
the Delors Committee also satisfies the other reasons for the emergence of an 
epistemic community. It emerged because national executives were aiming at 
achieving international monetary policy coordination. Moreover, if cooperation 
were to happen, the national executives would be confronted with "uncertainty", 
"interpretation" and "institutionalization". It would involve "uncertainty" as it 
would not be guaranteed whether Member State governments would really be 
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committed to the common policy goals, i.e. low inflation, exchange rate stability. 
and, in support of these two goals, reducing budgetary deficits. "Interpretation" 
would occur as soon as the EMU arrangement would become taken up in the 
amended Treaty of Rome. The time-table and formulation of the convergence 
criteria was not done by the central bankers in the Delors Report, but was merely 
hinted to. They were drafted by the monetary committee and agreed to at the 
eleventh hour at the Maastricht negotiations (Italianer !993). Finally, 
"institutionalization" of monetary policies and of limits on budgetary policies 
was, of course, the ultimate aim of the EMU project. 
The experts that made up the Delors Committee were part of a wider group 
of experts that considered monetary policy to be most effective if conducted by 
an independent central bank, and be conducted most effectively if price stability , 
was considered its main objective. The opinion of these particular experts was 
considered important, not only because of their 'objective knowledge' about 
monetary matters, but also because of their position, i.e. being central bank I 
presidents or, in the case of the independent experts, being prominent monetary 
experts. Their institutional position and prior record contributed importantly to 
how their recommendations were valued by the outside world. In this sense the 
Delors Committee consisted of experts that were authoritative figures in the 
domestic arena, and whose expertise on monetary matters was widely recognised, 
due to their institutional position. These monetary experts were not just any 
random group of experts. They Were carefully selected in order to be 
authoritative and credible actors both in the domestic and the European arena (cf 
Adler and Haas 1992: 371-2). Moreover these actors did not necessarily 
reproduce knowledge for the sake of it; they also produced knowledge, i.e., 
created their blueprint as they went along. Hence the members of the epistemic 
community operated using both the advantages of their objective expertise and 
their institutional position, i.e . the structure in which they operated (cf Radaelli 
1997: 169). 
Let us now tum to the four ways in which an epistemic community can 
exert influence according to Haas ( 1992). First, policy innovation -- indeed the 
Delors Committee decided the nature of the issue and the policy objectives. It 
decided to have a single currency rather than a parallel currency, to set up a 
European Central Bank rather than a European Monetary Fund, and it determined 
that the ECB should be politically independent and aim at price stability. It also 
decided that the European Council should take the political decision on these 
issues. Policy diffusion occurred in the Delors Committee meetings. 
Transnational links were used to communicate the opinion of the experts. Policy 
selection occurred both prior to and after the selection of the Delors Committee A 
members. The choice made by the European Council to have central bankers ~ 
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draft the EMU blueprint implied that a independent European Central Bank 
would likely come out of the process. Yet the national governments had an after 
the fact decision when adopting the Delors Report. Policy persistence had 
occurred by having the experience of the 1980s, and will prove itself during the 
1990s and beyond depending on whether central bankers remain convinced of 
their choices of the EMU regime. Policy leaming in the 1980s was a necessary 
condition without which EMU would not have been possible. 
Now, how did the national executives benefit from consulting this 
particular epistemic community? To start with, when the European Council 
requested the Committee to investigate the possibility of creating an EMU. not 
all Member State governments were in support of its creation. Notably the British 
/ government was very much opposed to the whole project. Though it may seem 
puzzling to some as to why the British government agreed to the investigation of 
a possible road to EMU, the British themselves claimed the Report would not 
imply they would accept the policy recommendations; it was merely a theoretical 
exercise.9 The main reason why the British government did not oppose the 
drafting of an EC EMU blueprint was that they feared that West Germany, 
France and the Benelux could form an EMU on a multilateral basis, which would 
eliminate British influence over the process. 
Thus, the governments in favour of EMU would benefit from a study 
carried out by a committee of monetary experts. Second, the Member State 
governments knew that it would still be highly controversial to introduce an 
Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community, as it implied 
institutionalising a monetary regime that thus far had been dominated de facto by 
German monetary policies, and the strength of the D-Mark. The very fact that 
Member State governments anticipated the fact that the German monetary regime 
could well become the core of European monetary policies implied that they also 
knew that if a European Central Bank (ECB) were to be set up, it would likely be 
modelled on the Bundesbank, i.e. become a politically independent central bank. 
The governments who held more reservations to this model (e.g. S ain and the 
United Kingdom) found themselves confronted with the successful achievement 
ofiOw inflatiOllln Germany and in countries which had pegged their currencies 
close to the D-Mark -- an objective which they themselves tried anxiously to 
reach as well. And again for these countries, the absence of a European 
agreement could well imply that several countries could go ahead and implement 
a single currency zone outside on a multilateral basis outside the framework of 
the EC. The prospect of having a say in the setting up of the scheme, and 
possibly the prospect of staying outside such a scheme, was a point of major 
concern to countries such as Spain and the UK. Therefore, these countries were 
willing to make some compromises to their original positions. Moreover, the fact 
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that the Delors Committee of experts would decide a feasible blueprint for EMU, 
facilitated the explanation at home of agreeing to the selected type of EMU 
which was based strongly on the German model. Hence, it was very convenient 
1
. 
for all parties to give the task of initiating policy to a group of central bankers 
and independent specialists, and have them suggest the ECB's independent status 
and its mandate . This was important especially because, as was mentioned above, 
most EC central banks in fact were sti ll obliged to accept instructions from their 
national governments. Finally, as was also mentioned above, no political 
consensus could be found among Member State governments on accepting a 
macro-economic or fiscal authority to 'flank' the monetary institution (see also 
Verdun 1996). A group of central bankers would be an epistemic community 
unlikely to recommend the need for such an institution to be introduced at the 
European level. 
EVALUATING THE UTILITY OF THE EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES 
CONCEPT FOR THE CASE OF EMU 
It can be concluded here that the Delors Committee operated as the definition of 
an epistemic community suggests. National governments sought a body of 
experts who could back up their policy choice, and they could use the experts' 
collective knowledge and advise to support their decisions. Without the report of I 
the experts, national governments would remain very suspicious about the I 
motives and goals of other national governments. 
Does this role of an epistemic community in the process of creating EMU 
add to the literature on EMU as set out in Section Two above? In other words, 
has the Delors Committee not just prepared a decision which actually resulted 
from traditional international bargaining, or aimed at solving domestic problems, 
or to tackle the problems related to the global economy and the unmanagabililty 
of the domestic economy? The analysis provided here does not suggest that the 
Delors Committee was a political actor which stood "above" the political struggle 
between nation states. It was asked its advice (i.e . how to create EMU in the EC) 
precisely because national decision makers needed extended legitimacy and 
knowledge about how to make the next step in international cooperation. In that 
sense considering the Delors Committee as an epistemic community helps us 
understand strategies used to tackle the 'two levelled' nature of the policy-making 
process; bargaining that takes place between states and legitimize policy 
decisions at the domestic level. For both these levels , using the knowledge from 
the epistemic community proved useful. Furthermore, a necessary condition was 
that the central bankers had all gone through significant monetary policy 
learning, which meant that they could also agree on a single monetary policy. 
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Finally, the role of global factors and changing perception of the global economy 
implied that national executives were disillusioned about independent 
uncoordinated policy decisions, and were hence interested in a common policy. 
Hence, the central bankers could only be given such an important and 
~ authoritative voice because Member States realised that economic 
interdependence implied that their room for manoeuvre to solve domestic 
problems in isolation from others, or without coordinating policies with 
surrounding countries, appeared increasingly limited. 
This paper has given an affirmative answer to its initial question whether 
consensus among monetary experts was necessary for the progress towards 
EMU. The conceptual tool of the epistemic community was found to be very 
useful. However, when applying the definition and re-examining Kapstein's 
earlier reservations on whether central bankers could be considered an epistem1c 
community, it was found that two amendments of the original definition 
(Kapstein 1992; Haas 1992: 3) are needed. First, even though monetary experts 
"" have moved ahead towards the creation of EMU because there was consensus 
among central bankers, this strategy also served diverging national imerests . 
... Second, within the epistemic community it is possible to have one or more 
dominating members, or a certain hierarchy, or some kind of leadership. 
This paper has shown that in order to improve our understanding of the 
process of European economic and monetary policy-making it is worth studying 
a committee of monetary experts . It would be interesting to see whether other 
expert committees in the Community can be regarded as epistemic communities 
as well and can help to explain the process of European public policy-making 
more generally. 
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NOTES 
I. On two level games see Putnam ( 1988) and Evans, Jacobson and Putnam ( 1993). 
2. The introductory article is found in Haas (1992) and the concluding article in Adler and Haas 
(1992). The papers were reprinted in P.M. Haas (1997). The concept of an epistemic community 
was originally introduced by John Gerald Ruggie ( 1975), who had borrowed from Michel Foucault 
(1973) the term ' episteme' to refer to "a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared 
symbols and references, mutual expectations and a mutual predictability of interests". (Ruggie. 
1975: 570). In this early article Ruggie gives no clear defmition of an epistemic community. 
However he does state that the epistemic community may play interrelated roles, which influence 
its members' perception of social reality. Epistemic communities are called upon especially to settle 
international issues when unilateral or bilateral agreements fail. Epistemic communities then 
contribute to collective arrangements. They set the rules of behaviour of collective responses to 
new situations. 
3. The example he gives is that economists form a profession, whereas "Keynesians" can be 
considered an epistemic community if they hold similar beliefs, views, ideas, goals and so on (Haas, 
1992: 19). Applied to our case this means that ' central bankers' would thus also not necessarily 
form an epistemic community. However, ' central bankers who favour an EMU' could, by contrast. 
constitute an epistemic community. 
4. The approach is usefully applied to the case of roads policy in the UK by Dudley and Richardson 
(1996) and to the EU policy-making process in particular regarding taxation by Radaelli (1995; 
1996; 1997). 
5. For an excellent account of the Advocacy Coalition approach, including its usage and 
applicability, see Sabatier ( 1998). 
6. One of the Members of the Committee was only during the European Council approached by 
Delors and asked whether he would be willing to serve on the Committee (member of the Delors 
Committee, interview with the author, October 1996). Gros and Thygesen consider the choice of 
this committee as part of a compromise package which they describe as resulting from 'an 
understanding between Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Jacques Delors' (Gros and Thygesen 
1998: 400). 
7. He was subsequently President of the European Monetary Institute, the predecessor of the 
European Central Bank. 
8. Niels Thygesen had been supportive of the European Economic Monetary integration objective 
for many years. In 1975 he was one of nine well-known economists who signed what was called 
The All Saints' Day Manifesto for European Monetary Union', which appeared in The Economist 
on I November 1975. It was an attempt to relaunch EMU by introducing suggesting the 
introduction of a parallel currency. 
9. In fact, after the publication of the Delors Report the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel 
Lawson, irrunediately announced that the Report was totally unacceptable as it implied a transfer of 
sovereignty which the UK goverrunent would not support. 
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